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Abstract
Brexit has far-reaching consequences for Europe and the European single market for financial transactions. In particular
in this field, the UK has had a strong influence in drafting European policies and legislation as the City of London has
acted as the financial hub in Europe for several decades. As a result, the UK has spearheaded the call for more market
friendly legislation with the support of some other EU member states. This went against the wishes of several other EU
member states, where a stronger rule-based approach to financial markets was strongly preferred, in particular after the
financial crisis clearly demonstrated weaknesses in the macroeconomic oversight of European financial markets. With the
UK leaving, the call for more stringent legislation will gain momentum as the political leadership among the remaining
27 EU member states will shift and might be looking to curtail the long-standing dominant position of the UK in the field of
financial industries. In this light, several leaders of EU27 member states have already voiced their support for their nations’
financial hub to become the next City of London. This would lead to a substantial change in leadership in European finance
post-Brexit. This contribution assesses the impact of Brexit on the changes in political leadership on the governance of
European financial markets, as they might ultimately be reflected in the institutional outcomes and policies.
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1. Introduction
On 23 June 2016, the citizens of the UK decided through
a referendum vote to leave the EU. The UK government
formally informed the EU of its decision to leave the
Union on 29 March 2017. After the two years withdrawal
period, the UK was thus expected to leave the EU by
29 March 2019. As no agreement could be found by that
date, the UK requested, and was granted, an extension
until 31 January 2020 after which the UK officially left the
UK, with a transition period lasting until the end of 2020.
After joining the European Communities in 1973, the
UK and the EU have moved together for almost 50 years,
which helps to explain the many issues and the long time
frame of the withdrawal process. As one of the largest
members of the EU, the UK always had a strong impact
on European decision-making. In certain areas, its role
has been even bigger due to the nature of the UK’s indus-
try and interests.
One such area is the financial sector. Globally, the UK
is the largest exporter of financial services, and approxi-
mately one third of that exports goes to the EU. Over the
years, the UK, and in particular the City of London, has
grown into the main hub for financial services in Europe.
Through its well-developed infrastructure and its histori-
cal growth, the City of London has ensured that it clears
and manages the majority of Euro-denominated finan-
cial transactions.
The City of London is not just the European finan-
cial hub; but also serves as the nexus between interna-
tional finance and the EU. The City’s role as a broker
between international and European companies has
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grown historically. By the start of the 20th century,
many American stock exchanges frequently used clear-
ing houses. At that time, London was the only European
stock exchange working with a clearing house, giving it
a significant first mover advantage. The result is that
over time the City of London came to substantially out-
size other European financial hubs in terms of foreign-
registered monetary financial institutions, making it the
main international finance hub in the EU. It is also the
place where most EU area and third country institutions
(mostly headquarter in the US and Switzerland) have set
up a large presence, as foreign financial firms currently
benefit from the fact that the UK license gives them
access to a European passport (see Schoenmaker, 2017).
European financial integration thus greatly benefited the
open and competitive UK financial sector.
Since Brexit, discussions on the location of finan-
cial services and the future of financial supervision have
heated up and attracted significant attention from pol-
icymakers and media outlets. At the current time, it is
yet unclear what the exact impact of Brexit would be
on the location and oversight of the financial industry.
Never before has one of the world’s largest economic
areas been decoupled from its financial capital. Few
and less outspoken historical examples include Vienna,
that after WWI ceased to be the financial capital of the
defeated and dismantled Austro-Hungarian empire, and
Montreal, which was replaced as Canada’s financial cap-
ital by Toronto as a result of Quebec’s separatism.
Part IV of the political declaration setting out the
framework for the future relationship between the EU
and the UK refers to financial services, but gives little
indication on what the future relationship may look like
in this field. It states that “the Parties are committed to
preserving financial stability, market integrity, investor
and consumer protection and fair competition, while
respecting the Parties’ regulatory and decision-making
autonomy, and their ability to take equivalence decisions
in their own interest” (European Commission, 2019b,
p. 5). It notes the parties have equivalence frameworks
in place to recognise each other’s regulatory and super-
visory regimes and agree to close a structured coopera-
tion on regulatory and supervisory matters. Beyond this,
the withdrawal agreement and political declaration give
little guidance on what the UK’s relationship will be in
these fields post-Brexit.
However, it is clear that as the UK will be leaving the
EU, it will no longer be able to have a direct influence
on the direction in which the governance of European
financial market develops. This has serious repercussions
for the political leadership in European finance, currently
heavily influenced by the UK. The next section provides
a review of the literature on Brexit on European finance.
After establishing that a focus on post-Brexit leadership
with regards to the governance of the EU single market
of financial services has been lacking, Section 3 then dis-
cusses the application of political leadership in EU stud-
ies. Section 4 then describes how political leadership in
European finance will shift from the UK to France or
Germany, and how this change will impact the gover-
nance of the EU financial markets. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Impact of Brexit on European Finance
The impact of Brexit on the UK has attracted a signifi-
cant amount of attention, from scholars and news out-
lets. Most of the scholarly contributions have focused
on either explaining the referendum outcome (e.g.,
Curtice, 2017; Goodwin & Heath, 2016), or on assess-
ing the impact of the withdrawal on the UK (e.g., Begg
& Mushövel, 2016; Bloom et al., 2019). More recently,
attention has also been devoted to the impact of Brexit
on EU policies (e.g., the thematic issue on the impact of
Brexit on EU policies; De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019).
The literature focusing on the impact of Brexit on
financial governance and the financial industry is a bit
more limited, and has focused broadly on 1) the eco-
nomic impact of Brexit, 2) the governance of the EU
financial single market, and 3) the role of the City of
London as international financial center. An initial inves-
tigation of the economic impact of Brexit on the UK’s
financial market has made clear that the UK is at risk
of losing significant income and jobs as a result of their
withdrawal (Batsaikhan, Kalcik, & Schoenmaker, 2017).
The financial industry represents some 7% of GDP and
generates major exports for the UK. The export of finan-
cial services is estimated to be affected most strongly
among all exports of services (Rehman & Della Posta,
2018). In light of its importance, the financial industry
in London has historically received significant protection
from the UK government, but as freedom of movement
issues have dominated commercial interests in the build-
up and aftermath of the referendum (Thompson, 2017).
The impact on the EU27 is expected to be much smaller,
and might be even positive (Van Kerckhoven & Odermatt,
2020), but could result in additional costs for companies
both in the UK as well as in the EU (UK Government’s
Actuary Department, 2017). However, it is clear that the
overall impact strongly depends on the eventual out-
come of the ongoing negotiations (Armour, 2017).
Brexit would also impact the governance of the
European financial markets. The exact impact is currently
difficult to assess as the withdrawal negotiations are
still taking place. National central banks within the EU
have different legal rules, risking competition on regula-
tory and supervisory practices between member states
(European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017). After
Brexit, the greatest uncertainty relates to the EU’s evolv-
ing supervisory/institutional arrangements which will
be drafted without UK involvement (Moloney, 2018),
whereby the European Supervisory Agencies could play
a larger role (Moloney, 2016). In light of this uncertainty,
one could expect the financial industry to collaborate
intensively across member states. However, Howarth
and Quaglia (2018) have argued that, rather than wit-
nessing cross-national alliances of financial industry
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members advocating broad access for the UK to the EU
single market in financial services, the main financial cen-
ters in the EU27 and their national authorities have been
competing to lure financial business away from the UK.
However, such a competition between member states
favoring a relocation of the UK-based financial services
to the EU27 poses certain challenges with regards to
the governance of European financial markets (Lavery,
McDaniel, & Schmid, 2019).
A relocation would greatly impact the role of the City
of London as one of the major international financial cen-
ters. From the 19th century onwards, London became
one of the global centres for lending and investment. Due
to the leading role taken up by London as well as the US in
dealing with, as well as in developing, financial products,
English contract law became widely adopted for interna-
tional finance, whereby the legal services where often
provided in London (Wood, 2008). London was always an
international rather than a domestic financial centre, far
more than New York, Frankfurt, Paris or Tokyo. In a simi-
lar vein, the City of London grew to become the European
financial centre, in particular in wholesale financial ser-
vices, slowly overtaking other European financial centres,
such as Frankfurt, Paris and Amsterdam. This has spurred
the development of a whole industry dealing with finan-
cials services in the UK.
Another factor that has spurred the development
of London as the premier European financial centre
relates to clearing houses. By the start of the 20th cen-
tury, many US stock exchanges frequently used clear-
ing houses. At that time, London was the only European
stock exchange working with a clearing house, giving it
a significant first mover advantage. The role of clearing
houses was further expanded in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis. At the 2009 G20 meeting in Pittsburgh,
the leaders of the G20 decided that all standardized
derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges and
cleared by clearinghouses (Wouters, Van Kerckhoven, &
Odermatt, 2013). Because of this G20 decision, London
was able to further strengthen its position as the prime
international financial hub in the EU due to its leading
role in interest rate over the-counter derivatives (75% of
all transactions denominated in euro; Batsaikhan et al.,
2017). Moreover, the G20 decision resulted in the need
to novate a wide variety of over-the-counter derivatives,
ensuring that clearing is essentially and increasingly so,
the backbone of modern financial markets. Post-Brexit,
it is anticipated that the UK would lose some of its
power in the clearing houses business (Van Kerckhoven
& Odermatt, 2020).
An issue that so far has failed to attract scholarly
attention is that Brexit also leads to a shift in leader-
ship in the European single financial market. With the
UK potentially at the sideline of EU financial decision-
making, some other member states will receive a larger
leading role in the governance of the EU single market in
financial services. Leadership post-Brexit has been inves-
tigated in light of other issue fields (Tömmel & Verdun,
2017), such as climate change (Dupont & Moore, 2019)
and in relation to the role of certain countries (Krotz
& Schild, 2018), but an in-depth investigation in what
the impact of Brexit entails for leadership in European
finance has been lacking. This is all the more surprising
since compared to other issue fields, the impact of Brexit
on leadership is arguably more substantial in the field of
European finance.
3. Ideational and Coercive Political Leadership and
the EU
Brexit will impose a tremendous shift in the European
political landscape dealing with finance and the finan-
cial industry. This article aims to add to this literature
by focusing on how Brexit changes the political leader-
ship within the EU’s financial governance. Leadership
can be approached as an input dimension in the polit-
ical decision-making, that through the decision-making
process, influences the outcomes, as witnessed in poli-
cies and decision-making. As currently, Brexit has not
lead to a change in the EU decision-making processes,
and assessing outcomes is premature, focusing on the
changing leadership as an input dimension into the polit-
ical process allows us to shed a light on how the EU’s
approach towards finance might change, and will influ-
ence institutional outcomes in the future.
Political leadership has been the subject of studies,
both theoretical and empirical, for several decades (start-
ing with the seminal work of Burns, 1978). However,
within this growing body of scholarly work, consensus
on a definition is still missing. Moreover, a variety of
approaches have been employed to the study of polit-
ical leadership. Consequently, there is a wide variety
and a deep richness in its study, but the concept itself
remains ill-defined (Elgie, 2001). During the last decade,
increasing scholarly attention has been devoted to ‘polit-
ical leadership in the EU.’ This literature focuses often
on individuals or individual institutions, for example, Cini
(2008) and Tömmel (2013, 2020) have investigated the
European Commission presidents from a leadership per-
spective. In a similar vein, the presidents of the Council
and the European Council have been studied extensively
(Bunse, 2009; Dinan, 2013; Tallberg, 2006) as well as
the EU High Representatives (Koops & Tercovich, 2020).
In a similar vein, research has studied the leadership of
institutions, such as the European Central Bank (Verdun,
2017) or the European Parliament (Shackleton, 2017).
The particular set-up of the Union means that leader-
ship should be perceived differently than in nation states.
The fragmented character of European polity, and the
dense web of institutions and network structures, war-
rant a specific focus. In this light, the role of member
states is not to be underestimated. Indeed, individual
member states steer the agenda and decision-making of
the EU.
An in-depth overview of how Brexit can lead to a
shift in European leadership in the financial sector and
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its oversight is so far missing. This article adds to the
literature by looking into the two dimensions of leader-
ship: Ideational leadership and coercive leadership and
studies how they impact the governance of EU single
market for financial services after Brexit. In essence, this
lens allows to answer the questions: 1) Who would lead
political decisions related to financial governance?; and
2) what would be the impact of the changing leadership
on the content of financial policies?
Coercive leadership provides an angle to answer the
first of these questions. It relates to the instances in
which one party gathers leverage over the other party.
This could for example be the fact that one member
state has access to resources that are useful to the
other party who might lack access to these resources. In
this case, interest-based hard bargaining can take place
between member states (Milward, 1992), whereby the
outcome is often influenced by the resources and pres-
sure exercised by the different member states (Keohane
& Nye, 1989). In such a setting, the bargaining among
resourceful member states interacts with endogenous
factors such as potential coalitions available. Public state-
ments and media are often used in order to support
the bargaining strategies. In all issue fields, as in finance,
coercive leadership requires clout in the specific issue
field. In terms of size and overall influence, it has often
argued that proposals without the support of power-
ful member states such as France, Germany and the UK
stand little chance in passing, whereas proposals that
are supported by them are in general accepted (Bulmer
& Paterson, 2013; Schild, 2010). Agreement between
the powerful member states often leads to swift action,
whereas disagreement often results in delayed decision-
making. Of course, with the UK leaving the EU, several
of the findings of previous literature might no longer
hold. An initial investigation proposes that after Brexit
three scenarios are likely in terms of the countries tak-
ing the lead in the EU, of which the most probable is
a strong Franco –German relationship (Krotz & Schild,
2018). The UK, as the other major powerhouse, has often
been perceived as an awkward partner to the European
integration project (George, 1998). Notwithstanding this
general statement, it is clear that this does not hold for all
issue fields (Daddow & Oliver, 2016). However, as argued
below, the UK has often found itself at disagreement
with several other EU member states when it comes to
regulating financial markets. Complementarily, member
states yield more weight in issue fields where they have
larger resources. In European finance, having a strong
financial industry would provide a member state with a
larger influence at the negotiation table.
To answer the question on what the impact on the
policies of the changed leadership could be, we turn
to ideational leadership. Ideational leadership can be
defined as the capacity of actors to influence other
actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs through the use
of ideational elements (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2018).
Exercising leadership then happens through persuasion
or occurs through the imposition of ideas. Policy propos-
als are then framed in relations to underlying ideas, that
could be deeply rooted in societies. Within European
decision-making, individual member states’ heads of
state or government play an important role, both directly
in the European Council, as indirectly as representatives
of their national constituency. These leaders are elected
in their national environment, and often act in order to
represent their national interests, which have often been
shaped historically. These leaders’ actions are thus influ-
enced by their national culture which is impacted by cur-
rent and historical predispositions on how companies
should be regulated and deep-rooted beliefs on the struc-
ture of economies.
The extent to which individual member states apply
ideational and coercive leadership depends on the spe-
cific importance of the issue for their national economies.
When Heads of government or state care strongly about
a specific issue field, they will exercise more leader-
ship in order to attain an outcome that is close to their
national interests.
Several scholars have tended to focus on the ‘static
effects’ of Brexit, by looking at what the EU and its poli-
cies would look like if the UK was simply taken out of
the “EU ‘equation”’ (Jacobs, 2018; Jensen & Snaith, 2018,
p. 255). The focus on leadership in European finance
taken in this article allows for a ‘dynamic’ investigation.
As Brexit involves actors that continuously adjust their
preferences and/or strategies, such an approach shows
greater promise (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019), and
gives the ability to assess potential future developments.
In order to assess the impact of Brexit on the gover-
nance of EU finance, this article builds upon scholarly
work, and related publications, such as report and pub-
lic statements.
4. Shifting Leadership in European Finance
The decision of the UK to leave the EU has triggered a
wide variety of questions related to the future of the City
of London as financial hub, and the future evolution of
the EU single market in financial services. The extent to
which the remaining EU members and the UK will con-
tinue to cooperate crucially depends on the outcome
of the ongoing negotiations and the final agreement.
However, notwithstanding the content of the final agree-
ment, the UK no longer has a seat around the table and
will find its influence in EU decision-making substantially
reduced. As a result, the decision of the UK to leave the
EU thus allows for a significant shift in the political lead-
ership of the EU.
This shift can be expected to be considerable in the
field of European finance, as the UK has had a strong
impact on the development of policies and legislations
dealing with European finance. From the perspective
of coercive leadership, the UK has pre-Brexit benefitted
from its status as one of the powerful member states,
due to its size and power in decision-making as well as
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due to its authoritative role as being the home to the
premier European financial centre. As most European
financial transactions took place in the City of London,
it became the nexus between European and interna-
tional finance, and has allowed the UK to have a strong
influence on the development of the European finan-
cial market. After Brexit, London would no longer be the
financial capital of a major economic area. This calls into
question the future of the City of London as a global
financial centre. Historically speaking, the single time
that a financial centre was able to grow into one of
the global financial hubs, was the rebirth of, striking
enough, London in the 1960s as the financial capital of
a medium economic power. Only after joining the EU
London became the financial capital of a major economic
area and satisfied the above requirement as a leading
global centre (Cassis, 2018).
As the UK and the City of London do not want to
lose their status as an international financial centre, and
are reluctant to give up the ability to exercise leadership,
a fight between the UK and other EU member states
(as well as the European institutions) as emerged with
regards to the potential move of the UK’s financial sec-
tor to the EU27. Faced with a potential relocation of its
industry, London is actively trying to sell its ‘assets’: The
concentration of expertise in London, the UK’s compar-
atively light-touch regulatory framework, the usage of
English common law and the country’s well-established
financial infrastructure (Bank of England, 2015). After the
publication of the white paper, in which the UK govern-
ment stated not to seek single market access after Brexit
(UK Government, 2017), the UK-based financial industry
has recognized that it was unlikely to be able to preserve
its EU passport and has started to advocate the usage
of equivalence recognitions, assuring as much access as
possible to the single market. The UK-based financial
industry pointed out that equivalence agreements would
provide significant benefits to EU customers, and that
fragmentation would increase costs and risk.
As the UK has lost its voice in EU decision-making
and faces the prospect of a potential move of (part
of) its financial services industry, its ability to lead with
regards to financial policies leadership is waning. This
allows some of the EU27 member states to step in
and fill the void, potentially providing these member
states with more leadership in the governance of the
European financial market. Internally, EU member states
are divided on the question who would be best placed
to provide this leadership and potentially serve as a new
host to the UK’s relocating financial industry. Clearly, in
order to be able to exercise leadership, potential candi-
dates to host a EU27 financial hub need to be powerful
member states. The prospect of establishing a financial
hub within the EU27, has spurred potential host coun-
tries to take a hard line with regards to the negotiations.
For example, France and Germany (without opposition
of other EU member states) have taken a strong stand on
removing third country access for the UK financial indus-
try, thereby supporting a relocation of the UK-based
financial industry (Ringe, 2018).
Ever since Brexit, both these countries have also
actively pursued an attraction strategy and have been
promoting their national financial capitals as the next
premier location for European finance in order to
increase their potential leading role in the near future.
Some other EU27 member states with second-tier finan-
cial centres and significant financial sectors also have
the potential to gain from Brexit are Ireland (Dublin),
Belgium (Brussels), the Netherlands (Amsterdam) and
Luxembourg, but lack the cloud of Frankfurt and Paris,
both politically and in terms of the strength of their
respective financial industries.
Paris has struggled to survive as a major financial
centre over the last century, due to its slow liberalization.
However, the creation of Euronext, through the merger
of the stock exchanges of Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels
and Lisbon, ensures that Paris is now home to a major
European stock exchange. In the aftermath of the Brexit
vote, several initiatives have emerged to bring Paris back
into the spotlight, whereby investors’ associations, bro-
kers, banks, and Euronext and Euroclear have joined
French politicians in the battle (Quennouëlle-Corre,
2018). The relocation of the European Banking Authority
to Paris, with competition from Brussels, Dublin,
Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Prague, Vienna and Warsaw,
has proven to be the first success story. At the same
time, Germany has made relocating to Frankfurt more
attractive. For example, the German Eurex has come up
with a profit-sharing scheme on interest swaps and has
announced to extend this to foreign exchange deriva-
tives. German politicians have also regularly voiced
their support for the creation of an EU27 financial hub
in Frankfurt.
The push from both France and Germany for creat-
ing a financial hub in the Eurozone is not new and has
been on the back of the minds of European leaders and
institutions for a while. In January 2009, then French
Minster Christine Lagarde (and now President of the
European Central Bank) stated that euro-denominated
transactions needed to be cleared in the euro area
(“France wants ECB,” 2009) instead of in the City of
London, as the UK is not an eurozone member. In
2011, the European Central Bank followed suit and spec-
ified that large-scale clearing houses dealing with euro-
denominated trades should be fully incorporated in the
euro area, where the full operational and managerial
control should be located (European Central Bank, 2011).
The European Court of Justice eventually stated that the
European Central Bank did not have the legal powers
to require such a move as the European Central Bank
lacks explicit regulatory competence with regards to the
clearing of securities, which could only be obtained via
an amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (General Court of the European Union,
2015). However, the issue has since been reopened.
The European Securities and Markets Authority (2017)
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has issued a guidance stating that competition in regu-
latory and supervisory practices should be avoided, fol-
lowed by the European Central Bank stating its concerns
with out-of-eurozone supervision and its fear that Brexit
might lead to the creation of shell companies within the
Eurozone (European Central Bank, 2020). The position of
the major European institutions clearly indicates that a
decision to grant passporting rights to UK-based financial
services would not be deemed favourable. If the UK loses
its EU passport, third country financial services currently
located in the UK, would need to relocate their opera-
tions and would have to set up European subsidiaries.
As the City of London currently serves as a global finan-
cial centre, most of these third country operations are
based in the UK. For example, the top five US invest-
ment banks locate about 90% of their European oper-
ations in London. In November 2016, the EU proposed
new rules on intermediate parent undertaking, which
would allow for more scrutiny by the European Central
Bank, which could affect the UK as it might force UK
and third country banks to have a capitalized subsidiar-
ity in the EU. This was adopted in a slightly adapted
version in 2019 (European Commission, 2019a). Adding
to this, the European Central Bank in September 2020,
increased the pressure on banks affected by Brexit as it is
not convinced that enough people, assets, and resources
had been transferred from London to the Eurozone to
ensure a smooth functioning financial system post-Brexit
(Arnold, 2020). As the supervisor of 25 new or restruc-
tured banking operations that because of Brexit have
grown substantially, the European Central Bank wants to
ensure that the Eurozone entities are structurally prof-
itable and do not rely on excessive back to back book-
ings of the parent company. The European Central Bank
has further emphasized that European financial prod-
ucts and consumers should be managed and controlled
in the EU. As such, the equivalence discussions have
bogged down in recriminations, and the fight over mov-
ing about €1,2 trillion of assets (four times the size of the
total of EU27 financial assets in 2017), is yet again in a
higher gear.
With both France and Germany looking to attract the
UK-based financial industry, their potential to become
leading hubs in European finance is rising. However,
it is clear that this would also mean that the inter-
national influence of the City of London would dimin-
ish, rendering London a regional (like Singapore) rather
than a global financial hub (such as New York). This
would mean that the EU27’s leadership in international
finance would shrink. In the medium run, as a lead-
ing economic area, the EU would need to host one of
the world’s leading financial centres, one that can com-
pete with the likes of New York, Shanghai, Hong Kong,
Singapore or Tokyo, in the same way as London does
today, unlike Paris or Frankfurt. Such a centre likely
will have a stronger ‘domestic’ or European orientation,
whereby London might still perform some of the inter-
national functions. The jury is out currently on whether
Paris and/or Frankfurt might become such a new inter-
national financial centre. Until that time, the fragmenta-
tion of the European financial services industry over sev-
eral locations, will lead to higher costs and risks as no
single location might achieve the necessary economics
of scale. So, banks and consumers might end up with
more expensive operations as fragmentation and over-
lapping EU27/London operations significantly increase
costs. This will in hamper the prospect of EU influence in
international finance (Wouters & Van Kerckhoven, 2019).
Having established that France and/or Germany are
most likely to lead future development in European finan-
cial governance, the question arises to what extent this
would affect European financial policies. The UK has
traditionally always had a large influence on financial
governance as the promoter of a market-friendly envi-
ronment for the financial industry and as the biggest
non-eurozone country. Ideationally, the UK has always
been a proponent of a more market-friendly approach
towards the regulation of (financial) markets. Joined by
several other EU member states, such as Ireland, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Scandinavian mem-
ber states, the UK became a proponent of the market-
making coalition, who generally favoured more market-
friendly regulations (Howarth & Quaglia, 2017). Over the
last decades, the UK has often fought strongly to ensure
that EU financial regulation did not penalize their finan-
cial industry, and in doing so, represented the interests
of several other EU27 member states. Examples include
the UK (joined by the US) opposing to additional reg-
ulation of hedge funds (Fioretos, 2010), and defending
fiercely market-friendly solutions to the Eurozone crisis,
both at the EU level as well as globally (Wouters & Van
Kerckhoven, 2017). As a result, convergence between
member states in financial regulation, and deeper finan-
cial integration has been more limited. Post-Brexit, this
coalition will lose its strongest member. As a result,
the ‘New Hanseatic League’ has emerged as a member
state coalition composed of fiscally conservative and pro-
liberalization member states, such as the Netherlands,
Ireland, and the Nordic and Baltic states; with the aim to
counterbalance the strengthened (and less economically
liberal) Franco–German axis (Khan, 2018).
The market-friendly approach promoted by the UK
often stood in stark contrast with the preference of
other EU member states for a stronger rules-based
approach. This market-shaping coalition includes mem-
ber states such as Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, and
the other Mediterranean countries. Germany in partic-
ular has been seeking to establish a rule-based culture
in the EU financial market and discourages flexibility out
of fear that allowing suppleness might undermine the
entire system (Ringe, 2018).
After the financial crisis, the market-making coali-
tion, led by the UK, was already losing momentum. After
Brexit, it is to be expected that the market-shaping
approach will come to dominate, as the leadership pro-
vided by Germany and France will grow. However, that
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does not necessarily mean that Germany and France will
find themselves aligned in terms of ideational leadership,
when it comes to the content of a stronger rule-based
approach due to their historically different perspectives
on European integration. Whereas Germany historically
focused on economic harmonization and fiscal discipline,
France can be seen as less strict and more in favour of
governmental intervention. Both perspectives are also
supported by a number of other EU27 member states.
As an example, the German government has often been
rather sceptical of redistributions, and bailout plans.
It ‘tacitly’ approved the strong opposition of the ‘New
Hanseatic League’ to larger bailout plans. In contrast,
France is often more positively inclined towards redis-
tributive measures. However, when Germany and France
agree, they have been able to broker deals (or put the
brakes on those deals they did not like) as a tandem
(Degner & Leuffen, 2020). Therefore, Brexit contributes
to opening a reform window in eurozone governance.
On the one hand, it creates an opportunity for a revival
of Franco–German bilateralism, as both are committed
to eurozone governance reforms, particularly in France
after the election of Emmanuel Macron (Krotz & Schild,
2018). On the other hand, the combined effects of Brexit
and the French election have put pressure on Germany
to accept more financial redistribution and risk-sharing
(Coalition Treaty, 2018).
However, an ideational shift towards a more market-
shaping approach could isolate the UK, which could pro-
vide additional challenges. A City of London that does
not need to abide to more stringent EU rules could
become an important competitor to the European finan-
cial centre(s) that might emerge. Freed from EU regula-
tory requirements, the UK financial regulator might, in
the short run, pursue more deregulation attempting to
attract EU business to the City, weakening the European
(and global) financial system in return. The residual
power of the City could then also place pressure on EU27
financial centres to compete on market-friendly terms.
Even with a waning influence, the City will continue to
exercise some influence, and will deploy its assets strate-
gically in order to retain some power in EU and interna-
tional finance. However, its direct leadership will be lim-
ited, and its ability to pursue this leadership through the
international sphere might also be limited.
Additionally, as the most powerful non-eurozone
country, the UK always defended the interests of
the euro-outs as financial integration continued
(Chang, 2017). With Brexit, the largest and strongest
non-Eurozone economy in the EU is leaving. As a result,
Brexit will shift the balance between the euro-ins and
euro-outs. The latter now fear a second-class status,
as they will have a much harder time resisting the
attempts of the euro-ins of deepening the institutional,
legal and political integration of financial markets. Brexit
as such could thus lead to a clear multispeed Europe
whereby the lines separating the Euro-ins and the
Euro-outs deepen.
5. Conclusions
This article investigates the impact of Brexit on political
leadership in the field of European finance. As a pow-
erful member state and as the location of the premier
financial hub in the EU, the UK has been able to sig-
nificantly influence and provide leadership in European
financial governance. Moreover, the UK, joined by some
other EU member states, has been able to impose a
market-making culture promoting lesser and more lax
regulations than what some other member states, such
as Germany and France would have preferred. As the
largest non-eurozone EU member state, it has further
been successful as a promoter of the interests of the
euro-outs. As such, the UK was able to exercise signifi-
cant ideational leadership.
Brexit changes all these dynamics. Post-Brexit, the
UK will no longer have a direct influence on EU decision-
making. Moreover, several EU member states and insti-
tutions have been advocating for the creation of a EU27
financial hub, which would relocate a significant part of
the current UK-based financial services. Both these devel-
opments will lead to a substantial decline in the potential
for UK political leadership.
France and Germany have already voiced their sup-
port for their respective national financial centres to
replace London as the European financial hub. As both
these countries are already among the most powerful
member states in European finance, hosting the new
EU27 financial hub would allow them to exercise even
more political leadership. If France and/or Germany
replace the UK as the leading European financial hub, it
can be expected that this would also lead to a different
type of ideational leadership. Both France and Germany
would be in favour of more stringent regulation, par-
ticularly after the recent financial crises. A stronger
rules-based approach towards the financial industry will
replace the UK-backed more market-friendly approach.
At the same time, this would leave some other market-
friendly member states isolated. They might be joined
in their discontent with the changing leadership, due
to Brexit, by non-eurozone countries, who might not be
able to voice their concerns loudly anymore.
The residual power of the City could also place pres-
sure on EU27 financial centres to compete on market-
friendly terms. Even with a waning influence, the City will
continue to exercise some influence, and will deploy its
assets strategically in order to retain some power in EU
and international finance. However, its direct leadership
will be limited, and its ability to pursue this leadership
through the international sphere might also be limited.
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